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I. INTRODUCTION 
In February of 2008, Fidel Castro stepped down from power as 
Cuban leader, due to failing health, after forty-nine years in office.1 In 
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a farewell address to delegates at the Seventh Congress of the 
Communist Party of Cuba (“CPC”) in April of 2016, Castro expressed 
his personal belief that the enduring “ideas of [ . . .] Cuban 
communists” lent proof to the proposition that, with dedicated hard 
work, the Cuban government “can produce the material and cultural 
goods that human beings need.”2 He advised the delegates to “fight 
without truce to obtain” these goods for citizens.3 Those material and 
cultural goods citizens need for a good life that, as a matter of human 
rights rather than privilege, 4  their leaders must fight tirelessly to 
provide for them, form the focus of this Article. 
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Bioethics, Information Technology Law, Insurance and Social Security Law, Legal Ethics, 
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Moral Superpower (Lexington, 2017), which work won the Cecil B. Currey Prize for Best Book 
on the Developing World for 2017 by the Association of Global South Studies. 
1. See, e.g., James C. McKinley Jr., Fidel Castro Resigns as Cuba’s President, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 20, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/20/world/americas/20castro.html 
[https://perma.cc/ZVV6-CEA8]; Castro Resigns Presidency of Cuba, After 49 Years, NPR (Feb. 
19, 2008), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=19157999 
[https://perma.cc/M2JV-7VM2]. 
2 . Roy Carroll, Fidel Castro Bids Farewell to Cuba’s Communist Party Congress, 
GUARDIAN (Apr. 19, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/19/fidel-castro-
farewell-speech-cuba-communist-congress [https://perma.cc/96ST-SL7U]. The congress of the 
party is the highest decision-making organ in both the government and the party. The first such 
congress, attended by a record 3,116 delegates, the largest ever, was held in December of 1975. 
See, e.g., Communist Party of Cuba (Partido Comunista de Cuba - PCC), GLOBAL SECURITY, 
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/cuba/communist-party.htm 
[https://perma.cc/24K7-F7EK] (last visited Sept. 20, 2019). 
3. Carroll, supra note 2. 
4. See Difference Between Right and Privilege, DIFFERENCE BETWEEN (July 14, 2012), 
https://www.differencebetween.com/difference-between-right-and-vs-privilege/ 
[https://perma.cc/KN7P-V7E9] (explaining that “[p]rivileges are conditional and can be 
withdrawn[,] while rights are inherent and cannot be withdrawn.”). For a description of the 
distinction between these two doctrines in US constitutional history, see Dennis J. Mahoney 
Kenneth L. Karst, Right-Privilege Distinction, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION (2000), available at https://www.encyclopedia.com/politics/encyclopedias-
almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/right-privilege-distinction [https://perma.cc/6VW4-R6EN]. 
From the standpoint of human rights advocacy, several factors make a human rights approach 
superior to one based on privilege. First, with human rights, the risk of derogation is minimized, 
given that phrasing one’s work in human rights terms “takes you back to the primacy of equality 
and dignity[,] no matter what the circumstance,” quoted in Philip C. Aka, Analyzing U.S. 
Commitment to Socioeconomic Human Rights, 39 AKRON L. REV. 417, 426 (2006). Second, 
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On November 25, 2016, little over seven months later, Castro 
died, aged ninety.5 Reactions all over the world, reflecting on his life 
and times, were mixed. Some remembered him positively for the access 
to socioeconomic goods he created at home and abroad, as well as for 
his commitment to equal treatment of peoples, evident in his support of 
national independence, opposition to colonial rule, and opposition to 
racism and xenophobia, to name these gestures. 6 Representative of 
these positive tributes were separate statements from Bill Bonnar and 
Jeremy Corbyn. Bonnar observed that “Castro’s entire political life was 
given to the struggle for Cuban independence[,] and the struggle for 
liberation and socialism all over the world.”7 Corbyn, then leader of the 
Labor Party in the United Kingdom, eulogized Castro as a “huge figure 
of modern history, national independence[,] and 20th century 
socialism.”8  “For all his flaws,” which he left unspecified, Corbyn 
gave Castro credit for many achievements, including building world-
class health and education systems, a record of international solidarity 
abroad, and support for the decolonization struggle in Angola which 
helped end apartheid in South Africa, ultimately making way for black 
majority rule in the land.9 In short, he said, the deceased Cuban leader 
“will be remembered both as an internationalist and a champion of 
social justice.”10 
Other sympathizers viewed Castro’s legacy negatively, for 
example, by remembering him only as a dictator who suppressed 
 
related to the first and reinforcing it, “[y]ou cannot reduce rights. You either have to hold the 
line or increase them.” Id. at 431 (quoting Cathy Albisa of the Center for Economic and Social 
Rights, a human rights group headquartered in Brooklyn, New York). 
5. See, e.g., Fidel Castro, Cuba’s Leader of Revolution, Dies at 90, BBC (Nov. 26, 2016), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-38114953 [https://perma.cc/SV5B-K2JY]; 
Raul Castro Announces Death of Fidel Castro, BBC (Nov. 26, 2016), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-latin-america-38115171/raul-castro-announces-death-of-
fidel-castro [https://perma.cc/74TA-G96H]. 
6. See infra notes 7-10 and corresponding text.   
7. Bill Bonnar, Fidel Castro: A 90[-]Year Cuban Legacy, SCOTTISH SOCIALIST PARTY 
(Nov. 27, 2016), https://scottishsocialistparty.org/fidel-castro-90-year-cuban-legacy/ 
[https://perma.cc/74TA-G96H]. Bonnar was at the time the national secretary of the Scottish 
Socialist Party. 
8. Jamie Doward, Castro was “Champion of Social Justice” Despite Flaws, Says Corbyn, 
GUARDIAN (Nov. 26, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/26/jeremy-corbyn-
left-uk-politics-fidel-castro [https://perma.cc/679Z-SPHJ]. 
9. Dan Bloom, Jeremy Corbyn Will Not Attend Fidel Castro’s Funeral, Labor Source 
Confirms, MIRROR (Nov. 28, 2016), https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/jeremy-corbyn-
not-attend-fidel-9353118 [https://perma.cc/AC5X-V4E2]. 
10. Doward, supra note 8. 
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freedom of expression in Cuba. 11  One such evaluation came from 
Donald J. Trump, then President-Elect of the United States who opined 
that Castro was “a brutal dictator who oppressed his own people for 
nearly six decades[,]” adding that his “legacy is one of firing squads, 
theft, unimaginable suffering, poverty and the denial of fundamental 
human rights.”12 
There were also tributes that combined these diametrically 
opposite assessments. A tribute that typifies this category was a 
statement by one Erika Guevara-Rose, Americas director of Amnesty 
International who remembered Castro as “progressive but deeply 
flawed.” 13  Guevara-Rose elaborated that Castro oversaw dramatic 
improvements in access to human rights, such as healthcare and 
housing, accompanied by an unprecedented drive to improve literacy 
rates across the country. 14  However, despite these achievements in 
areas of social policy, she went further, Castro’s long period in office 
“was characterized by a ruthless suppression of freedom of 
expression[,]” including arrest and harassment of dissidents for 
speaking out against the government, which she assessed as “Fidel 
Castro’s darkest legacy.”15 
Cuba has a population of approximately 11.5 million people, at 
least ten percent of which is Black.16 The largest island in the West 
Indies, it comprises the Island of Cuba (westernmost of the Greater 
Antilles), the Isla de la Juventud (Isle of Youth), and 1,600 small 
 
11. See infra note 15 and corresponding text. 
12. Julian Borger, Trump and Obama Offer Divergent Responses to Death of Fidel Castro, 
GUARDIAN (Nov. 26, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/26/fidel-castro-
death-obama-trump-response [https://perma.cc/A8BZ-NJCS]. See Javier Corrales, Fidel Was 
Hell, FOREIGN POLICY (Nov. 26, 2016), https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/11/26/cuba-fidel-
castro-was-hell/ [https://perma.cc/6R7E-LB5N] (contending that Castro “was a radical bent on 
transformational, alternative global development[,]” who paradoxically “left his country 
conservative, impoverished, and isolated”). 
13. Erika Guevara-Rose, Fidel Castro’s Human Rights Legacy: A Tale of Two Worlds, 
AMNESTY INT’L (Nov. 26, 2016), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/11/fidel-
castro-s-human-rights-legacy-a-tale-of-two-worlds/ [https://perma.cc/8MR4-DFHN]. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16 . Sandra A. Levinson & Franklin W. Knight, Cuba, BRITANNICA ONLINE 
ENCYCLOPEDIA (section under “People”), https://www.britannica.com/print/article/145542 
[https://perma.cc/9RDB-Q6CS]. The number is actually higher, given that about two-thirds of 
Cubans have some African roots. Anita Snow, Fidel Castro Heads to Africa, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Aug. 29, 2001), http://www.afrocubaweb.com/wcr.htm [https://perma.cc/XDQ9-
8XFA]. 
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offshore islands.17 Cuba is bordered by the Atlantic Ocean in the north-
east, the Gulf of Mexico in the north-west, the Straits of Florida in the 
north-central, the Cayman Trench in the south-east, and the Caribbean 
Sea in the south-west.18 Cuba lies about 90 miles south of Key West, 
Florida in the United States. It also has an 18-mile land border in the 
south-east where the US government maintains a naval base at 
Guantánamo Bay that it leases from Cuba.19 
From the standpoint of governmental system, Cuba is a socialist 
state founded on Marxist-Leninist doctrines, where the CPC retains a 
monopolistic role in the government and society as an “organized 
vanguard of the Cuban Nation.” 20  In the aftermath of his death, 
Castro’s successors have pledged to maintain this political system,21 at 
a time many socialist states elsewhere have abandoned communism.22 
Still on governmental arrangement, Cuba has a unitary system of 
government—made up of a central government, fifteen provinces, and 
one special municipality in Juventud Island—that derives its legitimacy 
from a 1976 constitution as amended in 1992 and 2002.23 For its legal 
system, Cuba has a civil law tradition based on Spanish civil code.24 
Economically speaking, Cuba operates a centrally planned 
economy matching its socialist government, but with a dose of market 
 
17. Australian Gov’t Dep’t of Foreign Affairs & Trade, Cuba Country Brief, DFAT, 
https://dfat.gov.au/geo/cuba/Pages/cuba-country-brief.aspx [https://perma.cc/ZY95-3J5C] (last 
visited Sept. 20, 2019) [hereinafter Australian Gov’t]. 
18 . Cuba, WORLD ATLAS (July 12, 2016), https://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/ 
countrys/namerica/caribb/cu.htm [https://perma.cc/X5QV-AJLG]. 
19. Australian Gov’t, supra note 17. 
20 . See Communist Party of Cuba, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Dec. 20, 2018), 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Communist-Party-of-Cuba [https://perma.cc/T2DH-LHR3]. 
See also Levinson & Knight, supra note 16 (under “History,” specifically “the Castro regime.”). 
21. See Diego Oré & Sarah Marsh, Cuba’s Raul Castro Vows to Defend Brother’s Legacy 
in Final Tribute, REUTERS (Dec. 3, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cuba-castro-
idUSKBN13S0SG [https://perma.cc/2KNB-TT7B] (stating that Raul Castro “pledged to defend 
the socialist legacy of his brother[,] Fidel Castro”); Shakir Husain, Cuba Sticks to Castro’s 
Foreign Policy under New President, DAILY SABAH (June 8, 2018), 
https://www.dailysabah.com/op-ed/2018/06/08/cuba-sticks-to-castros-foreign-policy-under-
new-president [https://perma.cc/965P-CTV5] (referring to Miguel Diaz-Canel, first non-Castro 
president since the revolution, who took over from Raul Castro in April of 2018). 
22. See Socialist Countries 2019, WORLD POPULATION, http://worldpopulationreview. 
com/countries/socialist-countries/ [https://perma.cc/8FDQ-DMLE] (last visited Sept. 20, 2019) 
As of today, 12 states, including China, Cuba, North Korea, and Vietnam, describe themselves 
as socialist states, while 23, including Angola and Mozambique, have abjured that title. 
23. Levinson & Knight, supra note 16 (section on “Government and Society”). 
24. Australian Gov’t, supra note 17. For more details, see, e.g., Kelly Buchanan, FALQs: 
Cuban Legal System, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (Jan. 27, 2015), 
https://blogs.loc.gov/law/2015/01/falqs-cuban-legal-system/ [https://perma.cc/C2L5-BSVC]. 
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forces designed to minimize the hardship effect of longstanding US 
embargoes on the country, 25  subsequently complicated by the 
withdrawal of generous Soviet assistance of about US $5.6 billion per 
annum. 26  Sugar exports remain among the mainstays of Cuba’s 
economy, but as the share of this product in foreign exchange has 
declined over the years from about seventy-five percent to below fifty 
percent, services appear to pick up the slack, with tourism, education, 
healthcare, and entertainment now accounting for about forty percent 
of employment within the country.27 
Under Castro, Cuban foreign policy in Africa was marked by 
energetic activities, particularly from about 1975 to 1991, that some 
commentators dub “intervention.”28 Since, as the Greek philosopher 
Socrates advised long ago, an unexamined life is not worth living,29 
this Article assesses and sheds light on these acts of “intervention,” 
focusing specifically on the social, economic, and cultural human 
rights (or socioeconomic human rights) plank of that policy. 
The academic literature tends to subsume Cuban investments in 
socioeconomic human rights in Africa under Castro (where it covers 
these rights at all) under its general program of military assistance in 
service of international communism (or the international socialist 
movement). 30  This Article takes a more disaggregating and 
 
25. See infra note 106 and corresponding text. 
26.  Levinson & Knight, supra note 16 (section on “Economy”). 
27. Levinson & Knight, supra note 16 (section on “Economy”). 
28 . See, e.g., Allan S. R. Sumnall, Cuban Intervention in Africa, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
LATIN AM. HISTORY AND CULTURE (2008), 
https://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-
maps/cuban-intervention-africa [https://perma.cc/8EVW-2BQV]; GEORGE EDWARD, THE 
CUBAN INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA, 1965-1991 (2012). See also Wolf Grabendorff, Cuba’s 
Involvement in Africa: An Interpretation of Objectives, Reactions, and Limitations, 22 J. 
INTERAMERICAN STUD. & WORLD AFFAIRS 3, 5 (1980) (pointing out that “[m]ost African states 
view Cuban intervention in Africa as help in achieving independence through self-help, rather 
than as a step toward the type of dependence which would result from a similar commitment by 
the super-powers”). 
29. See James M. Ambury, Socrates (469-399 B.C.E.), INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY, https://www.iep.utm.edu/socrates/#SSH2biii [https://perma.cc/CZ6L-Z2ER]. 
30. See generally JORGE I. DOMINGUEZ, TO MAKE A WORLD SAFE FOR REVOLUTION: 
CUBA’S FOREIGN POLICY (1989). On the international communist movement, see, e.g., Stephen 
A. Smith, Introduction: Towards a Global History of Communism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF THE HISTORY OF COMMUNISM 1-36 (Stephen A. Smith ed., 2014). Specifically, for Latin 
America, see Mike Gonzalez, Communism in Latin America, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE 
HISTORY OF COMMUNISM 252-67 (Stephen A. Smith ed., 2014). For one of the few exceptions 
to this general tendency, see Sergio Roca, Economic Aspects of Cuban Involvement in Africa, 
10 CUBAN STUDIES/ESTUDIOS CUBA 55-90 (1980). 
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complicated view. It portrays Castro’s contributions to socioeconomic 
human rights in Africa, in its own right, unattached to its general 
military assistance programs, as a function of three interrelated 
variables: (1) Cuban national security, (2) service to the international 
socialist movement, and (3) the synergistic interaction of these two 
variables. Moving forward, it argues that Cuba under Castro deserves 
recognition as a global Good Samaritan because of a broad view of 
national security the country undertook by pursuing principled policies 
abroad that consistently and systematically infused human rights in its 
external policies, one of a rare example from the socialist world in a 
literature dominated by attention to capitalist-oriented states.31 
This Article has six sections, including this introduction and a 
conclusion. Part II defines socioeconomic human rights. Part III 
provides a brief background history of Cuban-African relations. Part 
IV lays out the measure of Cuban military and socioeconomic 
assistance in Africa during the period of active engagement from 1975 
to 1991 at the heart of this Article. Part V, the centerpiece of the work, 
sets forth a multi-level explanation of Castro’s contributions to 
socioeconomic human rights in Africa. 
II. DEFINING SOCIOECONOMIC HUMAN RIGHTS 
To define socioeconomic human rights, it is appropriate to first 
determine the broader concept of human rights. “Human rights” are 
guarantees of freedom of various categories that, ideally, individuals 
and groups everywhere have equally, free of invidious discrimination, 
by virtue of the fact that they are human beings who need these rights 
to live a life of dignity.32 There are at least thirty-eight of these rights 
distilled from the international bill of human rights33—all, in turn, 
 
31. See infra Part 5.D. 
32. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, ¶ 1 (Dec. 10, 1948)  
[hereinafter UDHR] (pronouncing recognition of “the inherent dignity and of the equal and 
inalienable rights of all members of the human family” as basis for “freedom, justice and peace 
in the world”); id., art. 1 (stating that “[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity and 
rights”). 
33. See JACK DONNELLY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 7 (Table 1.1) (4th ed. 2013). 
Instruments of the international bill of human rights include the UDHR (1948), the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the last two of which came into force in 1976. Some 
commentators include the U.N. Charter (1945), the first instrument ever to use the language of 
human rights, among the documents of the international bill of human rights. The UDHR sets 
forth “common standards of achievement for all peoples and all nations” that the two human 
rights covenants, as binding multilateral treaties, then elaborated. 
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traceable to the four-freedom doctrine of then US President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt: freedom of speech and expression, freedom of religion, 
freedom from want, and freedom from fear.34 
The international human rights instrument that, in our time, 
popularized these rights is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(“UDHR”), adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 
1948,35 in the aftermath of a bloody global war hallmarked by denial 
of every measure of basic rights, including the right to life, and of 
access to food.36 As then Human Rights Watch chief, Kenneth Roth, 
poignantly stated in a commentary on this key human rights instrument, 
persons “who live in countries that respect the Universal Declaration 
in all its dimensions enjoy the freedom and means to live life to its 
fullest[,]” in that, for example, “[t]hey are able to speak their minds, 
practice the religions of their choosing, meet with their compatriots, be 
treated fairly by their government, and enjoy access to the necessities 
of life.”37 
In addition to individual rights, human rights also necessarily 
include group rights, testament of which is the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (known as the 
Genocide Convention) adopted on December 9, 1948,38 one day before 
the UDHR’s adoption on December 10. Various classifications of 
 
34. Louis Henkin, Human Rights: Ideology and Aspiration, Reality and Prospect, in 
REALIZING HUMAN RIGHTS: MOVING FROM INSPIRATION TO IMPACT 4 (Samantha Power & 
Graham Allison eds., 2000). President Roosevelt spoke about “four essential human freedoms” 
needed to build the peace after World War II. Each freedom was accompanied by the expression 
“everywhere in the world,” except for the fourth where he used “anywhere,” appellations which 
rendered these “essential human freedoms” universal. Regarding the last freedom, Professor 
Henkin commented: “freedom from fear—fear of enemies and tyrants—was doubtless a 
response to threats such as those posed by Adolf Hitler.” Id. 
35. UDHR, supra note 32. 
36. See UDHR, supra note 32, preamble (pointing out that “disregard and contempt for 
human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind,” 
paving way for “the advent of a world” where “freedom of speech and belief and freedom from 
fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people”); George J. 
Andreopoulos, Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Universal-Declaration-of-Human-Rights 
[https://perma.cc/2Y2N-5RQW] (last visited Sept. 20, 2019) (pointing out that “[t]he massive 
and systematic human rights abuses committed during World War II, including the Nazi 
genocide of Jews, Roma (Gypsies), and other groups, spurred the development of” the UDHR.). 
37. Kenneth Roth, Human Rights Organizations: A New Force for Social Change, in 
REALIZING HUMAN RIGHTS: MOVING FROM INSPIRATION TO IMPACT 230-31 (Samantha Power 
& Graham Allison eds., 2000). 
38. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. II, Dec. 
9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. 
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human rights exist,39 one of which is division into political-civil rights, 
such as the right to participate in one’s own government, and the right 
to freedom of expression, among others; and socioeconomic rights, 
next below, such as the right to food, shelter, healthcare, and education, 
among others. 
Socioeconomic human rights are guarantees of freedom, such as 
access to nutritious food, livable shelter, affordable healthcare, and 
affordable and skill-rich education, to enable individuals to provide 
these goods for themselves, without which non-socioeconomic human 
rights (i.e., political-civil rights), including even the right to life, ring 
hollow. They are the category of rights that Castro referred to as “the 
material and cultural goods that human beings need” that governments 
must “fight without truce to” provide.40 The international human rights 
instrument which, in the contemporary period, popularized these rights 
is the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(“ICESCR”), adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1966 
but came into force in 1976.41 
It should be clear by now that political-civil rights and 
socioeconomic rights are inextricably intertwined. Acknowledging  the 
complementarity and inseparability of these two generations of human 
rights, 42  the ICESCR proclaimed that socioeconomic rights 
represented a recognition that consistent with the UDHR, “the ideal of 
free human beings enjoying freedom from fear and want can only be 
 
39. See infra note 42. 
40. Carroll, supra note 2. 
41. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]. Interestingly, given its commitment to and achievements in 
this field, Cuba signed this instrument only in September 2008, after Fidel Castro left office, and 
is yet to ratify the multilateral treaty (without which it does not formally become part of its 
national law). See Ratification Status for Cuba, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR 
HUMAN RIGHTS, 
https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=44&Lang=
EN [https://perma.cc/TBZ2-65GR] (last visited Sept. 20, 2019). 
42. The division of human rights into generations is associated with Czech-French jurist 
Karel Vasak (1929-2015), who, in 1979, identified and theorized three generations of these 
rights coinciding with the tenets of the French Revolution: liberty, equality, and fraternity. See 
generally Karel Vasak, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/human-rights#ref61547 [https://perma.cc/B9X2-PGM8]. For 
Vasak, political-civil rights, tied to liberty, typify first-generation rights; socioeconomic rights, 
tied to equality, typify second-generation rights; and “collective-developmental” rights of 
peoples, such as the right to self-determination, tied to fraternity, typify third-generation rights. 
Id. See also Three Generations of Human Rights, GLOBALIZATION 101, 
https://www.globalization101.org/three-generations-of-rights/ [https://perma.cc/Y6WM-
4NR5]. 
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achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his 
economic, social and cultural rights as well as his civil and political 
rights.”43 Similarly, Franklin D. Roosevelt’s four-freedom doctrine, an 
acknowledged antecedent of the international bill of human rights, 
integrated these rights.44 
Many contemporary human rights scholars share this view 
regarding the interlinkage between political-civil rights and 
socioeconomic rights that counsel against sharp distinction between 
these rights. One of these scholars is Henry Shue who stated in his 
seminal 1980 work that, contrary to an evolved wisdom about the 
government’s role toward political-civil rights being “negative” 
mandating non-interference, vis-à-vis socioeconomic rights involving 
“positive” action, “the complete fulfilment of each kind of right 
involves the performance of multiple kinds of duties.”45 Put differently, 
for Shue, all human rights, whether political-civil rights or 
socioeconomic rights, entail three correlative duties: the duty to avoid 
depriving, the duty to protect from deprivation, and the duty to aid the 
deprived.46 Little wonder that the Vienna Declaration and Program of 
Action adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights held in 
Vienna, Austria, in 1993, stated incisively and unambiguously that 
“[a]ll human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and 
interrelated.”47 
III. BRIEF BACKGROUND HISTORY OF CUBAN-AFRICAN 
RELATIONS 
As they evolved under Castro, two discernible phases mark 
Cuban-African relations: (1) the period in the 1960s discussed in this 
section, and (2) the period of high energy circa 1975 until 1991 covered 
in the next section.48 A downside to the historical account this section 
sets forth is that it injects a periodization into the narrative that, given 
 
43. ICESCR, supra note 41, preamble. 
44. Henkin, supra note 34. 
45. HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 
35-64 (1996). 
46. Id. 
47. Vienna Declaration and Program of Action, art. 5 (adopted by the World Conference 
on Human Rights in Vienna) (June 25, 1993), 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/Vienna.aspx [https://perma.cc/L7VQ-
RKC6]. 
48 . For clarity’s sake, subsequent reference to these two periods in this Article will 
designate them as Phase 1 and Phase 2.   
2019] CASTRO AND SOCIOECONOMIC HUMAN RIGHTS 51 
the seamlessness in real life of the relations analyzed in the two 
sections, is ersatz and justified only analytically. Professor Gleijeses 
theorized that Cuban involvement in Angola in 1975, discussed later in 
this Article, “cannot be understood without looking at the past[,]” that, 
for him, began in Algeria (i.e., in Arab Africa, rather than Portuguese-
speaking Africa).49 Secondly, even more persuasive is the fact that 
Cuban involvement in Phase 2 mimicked its Phase 1, complete with 
similar tools of engagement, only bigger in scale in Phase 2. Thirdly, 
as Part IV shows, some scholars, such as again Professor Gleijeses 
merge Cuban military and socioeconomic assistance in the two phases 
together, rather than separate them.50 
Cuban interest in anticolonial movements in Africa developed 
soon after Castro came to power, mainly within the context of covert 
operations in support of liberation movements.51 The Cubans extended 
support to indigenous groups fighting for independence in Algeria, and 
in the then Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique as well as 
to newly independent African countries like Benin, Republic of the 
Congo (then Congo Brazzaville), Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, and Mali with whom Havana sought to build relations in 
Africa.52 Ernesto “Che” Guevara, Castro’s personal emissary, travelled 
to Cairo, the Egyptian capital, in June of 1959 and Raúl Castro did the 
same in July of 1960.53 Then in September of the same year, Castro 
delivered a speech at the United Nations which gave accent to African 
issues.54 
 
49. See infra note 76 and corresponding text. 
50. See infra notes 123-25 and corresponding texts.    
51 . Piero Gleijeses, Cuba’s Intervention in Africa during the Cold War, OXFORD 
BIBLIOGRAPHIES (Dec. 8, 2016), https://blog.oup.com/2016/12/cuba-intervention-africa-cold-
war/ [https://perma.cc/S4E7-X49P]. 
52. See Piero Gleijeses, Cuba’s First Venture in Africa: Algeria, 1961-1965, 28 J. LATIN 
AM. STUD. 159, 188 (1996). 
53. Id. at 159. 
54. Id. See Fidel Castro, Castro Denounces Imperialism and Colonialism, Speech before 
the U.N. General Assembly (Sept. 1960), available at  
http://lanic.utexas.edu/project/castro/db/1960/19600926.html [https://perma.cc/TB9N-TEGK]. 
In the speech Castro declared emphatically: “[w]e are ... on the side of the Algerian people, as 
we are on the remaining colonial peoples in Africa, and on the side of the Negroes who are 
discriminated against in the Union of South Africa. Similarly, we are on the side of those peoples 
that wish to be free, not only politically ... but also economically free, for there is one truth which 
we should all recognize as being of primary importance, namely, that there can be no political 
independence unless there is economic independence, that political independence without 
economic independence is a lie; we therefore support the aspirations of all countries to be free 
politically and economically.” Id. 
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Cuba’s socioeconomic assistance to Africa began in 1960 with a 
grant of scholarships to a group of students from Guinea.55 The Cuban 
government sent military and medical supplies to the Algerian National 
Liberation Front (“ANLF”) and after Algeria became independent in 
July of 1962, established a Cuban military mission in the country.56 
Similarly, Cuba sent a military mission to Ghana in 1961 soon after the 
country’s independence in 1957. 57  And following Ernesto “Che” 
Guevara’s visit in 1964 with leaders of progressive movements in the 
Portuguese countries, by 1965, Cuba sent military missions to these 
colonies.58 By the same token, Cuba dispatched troops to Zaїre and 
Congo Brazzaville in 1965.59 In the same year, in eastern Zaїre, about 
120 Cubans, led by “Che” Guevara, fought side by side with Zaїrean 
rebels.60 Cuba also provided assistance to insurgents in Guinea-Bissau 
between 1966 and 1974.61 
Algeria typified Cuban relations with Africa at this early period. 
“Algeria was Cuba’s headquarters in Africa[,]”62 a veritable gateway 
to Cuban’s entry into the continent in a relationship that went on from 
1961 to 1965.63 Havana supported Algeria because of its progressive 
potential from a revolutionary standpoint—and the force of example it 
signified for other African countries still under colonial rule and 
domination.64 “Until the overthrow of President [Ahmed] Ben Bella in 
1965, Algeria was Cuba’s closest friend on the continent. Cuba 
provided both military and civilian assistance not only to the Algerian 
republic but also, before their victory to the [freedom fighters] of the 
Algerian National Liberation Front.”65 
 
55. Gleijeses, supra note 52, at 165 n.24. 
56. Sumnall, supra note 28. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. Gleijeses, supra note 52, at 194. 
60. Id. at 167 n.28. 
61. Id. at 194. 
62. Id. at 185. 
63. See generally Gleijeses, supra note 52. 
64. In the words of the Cuban weekly, Verde Olivo, “[o]f all the countries in Africa, it is 
Algeria that takes the lead in helping the movements of national liberation. [ . . . ] It is a model 
that inspires other African peoples who are still marching along the slow road to national 
independence. The Algerian republic is a beacon for millions and millions of people throughout 
Africa.” Id. at 173 (quoting Verde Olivo). 
65. Id. at 159.  
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With little concern of possible backlash from France, Cuba under 
Castro “chose to help the Algerian revolution in deed and in word.”66 
Beginning with words (i.e., verbal gesture), from Castro down, Cuban 
officials strongly “proclaimed their country’s support for the Algerian 
cause,” including political support for Algeria at the United Nations.67 
Next to deed, in May of 1963, Cuba sent a medical mission of fifty-five 
medical workers to Algeria, made up of twenty-nine doctors, three 
dentists, fifteen nurses, and eight medical technicians.68 Of the team, 
forty-five were men while ten were women.69 The mission was led by 
Minister of Public Health José Ramόn Machodo Ventura, 70  who 
believed that, as Public Health Minister, he had a duty to see for himself 
firsthand where his doctors were posted. 71  In June of 1964, Cuba 
dispatched a second medical mission of sixty-one medical personnel, 
thirty-four men and twenty-seven women, comprising twenty-four 
doctors, four dentists, twenty-four nurses, and nine medical 
technicians.72 
Five observations are in order about this period. First, Havana 
operated very much as an independent actor, driven by Cuban domestic 
imperatives, rather than as a proxy of Soviet Russia, who would be a 
major player later in the ideological rivalry between East and West 
signified by the Cold War as it will unfold in Africa. 
Second, military assistance and socioeconomic goods 
complemented each other hand in glove to the point of indistinction. 
Frequently, Cuban military assistance was accompanied with medical 
assistance. For example, in August of 1965, during a visit to Havana, 
Zaїrean rebel leaders “extracted [from Castro] the promise that Cuba 
would send fifty doctors [to the rebel area].”73 As the following debt of 
gratitude from President Bella in October of 1962, months after the 
country’s independence July 5 of that year, makes clear, Cuban 
assistance included reckonable socioeconomic goods at the heart of this 
 
66. Gleijeses, supra note 52, at 161. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. at 165. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. at 167 n.28. Thus, “[i]n late September 1965, he appeared, unannounced, in eastern 
Zaїre, where some 120 Cubans, led by Che Guevara, were fighting side by side with the Zaїrean 
rebels.” Id. 
72. Id. at 169. 
73. Id. at 167, n.28, quoting the personal diary of Ernesto “Che” Guevara. 
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Article, “material and cultural goods that human beings need,” as 
Castro subsequently named them: 
We will never forget all you did for our refugees in Morocco and 
Tunisia.  We will never forget how you cared for our orphans and 
our wounded.  Comrade Fidel Castro, the National Liberation 
Front of Algeria has awarded only one medal of honor. We have 
awarded it to you.74 
This statement not only speaks to the substantial scale of assistance by 
a small country under the threatening shadow of a hostile superpower, 
but also to Cuba’s status as a global Good Samaritan. Singling out 
medical assistance for quick mention, by the 1970s and beyond, this 
assistance rose to a phenomenon whose accretion some scholars come 
to praise as “medical internationalism.”75 
Third, whether in military assistance or socioeconomic goods, the 
tools of assistance mimicked those that the Cubans would use in the 
1970s and 1980s at the highpoint of their engagement in the continent, 
the only difference being the larger scale of assistance extended in this 
later period. One Cuban official explained that Cuban involvement in 
Angola in 1975 “cannot be understood without looking at the past[,]” 
which past, in Professor Gleijeses’s assessment, “begins in Algeria, 
Cuba’s first love in Africa.” 76  This observation speaks to the 
seamlessness referred to earlier that makes periodization of the two eras 
covered in this Article artificial and understandable only from an 
analytic standpoint. 
Fourth, even at this early point in its foreign policy, Cuba 
displayed the features of states and other political communities that 
some perceptive scholars came to denominate global Good Samaritans. 
These countries defined their national interests broadly in a manner that 
goes beyond narrow emphasis on realpolitik.77 What for Cuba made 
these gestures particularly exemplary in selflessness was the picture of 
a “beggar” offering material help to others that the beggar was not 
really in a position to extend: the acts of socioeconomic assistance were 
 
74. Gleijeses, supra note 52, at 159, quoting Ahmed Ben Bella (emphasis added). 
75 . See generally JOHN M. KIRK & MICHAEL ERISMAN, CUBAN MEDICAL 
INTERNATIONALISM: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND GOALS (2009). 
76. Gleijeses, supra note 52, at 194. The Cuban official in question, among the individuals 
Professor Gleijeses interviewed for his article, was Manuel Agramonte. See id. at 194 n.151. See 
also PIERO GLEIJESES, CONFLICTING MISSIONS: HAVANA, WASHINGTON, AND AFRICA, 1959-
1976 (2002) (analyzing missions with an unbroken time range from 1959 until 1976). 
77. See infra notes 182-83 and corresponding texts. 
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“offered at a time when the exodus of doctors from Cuba following the 
revolution had forced the government to stretch its resources while 
launching its domestic programs to increase mass access to health 
care.”78 
To be sure, “[o]ne may argue that helping Algeria was in Cuba’s 
[national] interest, because Cuba needed friends in the Third World.”79 
Listen, for example, to this statement attributed to Jorge Serguera, 
Cuba’s ambassador in Algiers, capital of Algeria: “We will never forget 
the visit of President Ben Bella to our country one day before the 
Caribbean crisis [the Cuban Missile Crisis] exploded. Nor will we ever 
forget Algeria’s international solidarity toward us.”80 However, “one 
cannot deny that in helping those whom they considered victims of 
aggression, the Cubans risked tangible interest,” such as good 
relationship with the French government then under Charles de 
Gaulle.81 
Fifth, while the relations with Algeria exemplified Cuba’s 
investment in Africa, those relations were by no means limited to 
Algeria. Instead, driven by its Marxist beliefs and agenda, Cuba worked 
to exploit opportunities for relationship with countries in the still-
decolonizing region that were not limited to any one independent state. 
In his speech to the United Nations General Assembly in September of 
1960, Castro posited “[w]e are [ . . . ] on the side of the Algerian people, 
as we are on the remaining colonial peoples in Africa, and on the side 
of the Negroes who are discriminated against in the Union of South 
Africa.” 82  And during his visit to Africa in 1964, Che Guevara, 
Castro’s right-hand man, after stopping for talks with Algerian leader 
Ben Bella, toured Bamako, Brazzaville, Conakry, Accra, Cotonou, and 
Cairo (the latter twice) before heading back to Havana on March 14, 
1964.83 
 
78. Gleijeses, supra note 52, at 166. The quote about a beggar offering help came from 
José Ramόn Machado Venture, Minister of Public Health, embodied in a note to Professor 
Gleijeses in July of 1995. According to the Health Minister, “[i]n 1959[,] Cuba had about 6,000 
doctors, of whom some 1,500 had left the country by late 1962, and an equal number had asked 
to leave the country and the most we could do was to delay their departure for a while.” Id. at 
166, n.25 (internal quotes deleted). 
79. Id. at 191. 
80. Id. at 173. 
81. Id. at 191. 
82. Gleijeses, supra note 52, at 182. 
83. Gleijeses, supra note 52, at 188. 
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IV. MEASURING THE SIZE OF CUBAN SOCIOECONOMIC 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA CIRCA 1975 TO 1991 
Part IV of this Article highlights the quantum of Cuban 
socioeconomic human rights contributions in Africa in the period under 
review. Two observations are in order. First, the activities presented 
here are information in the public domain that, for example, do not 
include events below the radar of publicity, such as diplomatic 
initiatives. Moreover, given the climate of clandestineness that 
shrouded aspects of superpower competition in Africa during the Cold 
War, in which Cuba featured, there could have been some measures of 
assistance that went unreported.84 It is not hard to imagine that these 
under-the-radar activities include health, housing, and other 
socioeconomic goods at the focus of this Article.  Second, given that 
socioeconomic goods often tracked military assistance in the arsenal of 
Cuban aid, this presentation makes no sharp demarcation between the 
two tools.  
The ensuing discussion proceeds chronologically, based on the 
timing and progression of Cuban involvement: Angola, then Ethiopia, 
then Mozambique, and finally other portions of Africa like Namibia 
and South Africa. In Angola, the freedom-fighting group Cuba pitched 
its tent with and therefore the beneficiary of its assistance was the 
Popular Movement of Liberation (“MPLA”) under the leadership of 
Agostinho Neto.85 Compared to the National Front for the Liberation 
of Angola (“FNLA”) and National Union for the Total Independence 
of Angola (“UNITA”) backed by the United States and minority-ruled 
South Africa, Cuba assessed the MPLA as the most progressive entity, 
judged by revolutionary credentials or potentials, that it could work 
with. 86  Growth of Cuban involvement in Angola and Mozambique 
during the 1970s coincided with the breakdown of peace negotiations 
in Portugal in 1975.87 Initially, in Angola, Cuba sent three thousand 
combat troops and three hundred military advisers, along with tanks 
 
84. See Gleijeses, supra note 52, at 2 (stating that “[t]here has been small Cuban covert 
operations in Africa in the 1960s in support of liberation movements”). 
85. See Sumnall, supra note 28. The MPLA acronym and those of its two rivals, the FNLA 
and UNITA, are all in Portuguese.  
86. See id. 
87. See The Angolan Civil War (1975-2002): A Brief History, SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY 
ONLINE (Feb. 5, 2015), https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/angolan-civil-war-1975-2002-
brief-history [https://perma.cc/ATK7-6E4E]. 
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and fighter aircraft to the MPLA.88 Henceforth, the number of troops 
stationed in the country steadily increased: from twenty-four thousand 
in March 1976, to about forty thousand by 1984, and about fifty-five 
thousand in 1988. 89  Cuban records coupled with confirmation by 
Soviet defense officials showed that the decision to send Cuban troops 
in November 1975 to Angola was a Cuban initiative. It was a course of 
action based on the Castro regime’s long-standing ties with the 
Angolan nationalist movement led by Agostinho Neto. At least 
initially, the Soviet Union had no hand in that decision because it was 
preoccupied with détente meant to tone down the Cold War and achieve 
improved relations with the United States. 90  The US government 
subsequently confirmed this narrative.91 
In Mozambique, by the mid-1980s, Cuba sent seven hundred 
Cuban military and seventy civilian personnel.92 Compared to Angola 
and Ethiopia, Cuban engagement in Mozambique was low key. 93 
Cuban involvement in Ethiopia in September of 1977 followed the 
Somalian invasion of Ethiopia. The invasion was  Somalian leader Siad 
Barre’s attempt to realize the irredentist dream of a Greater Somalia on 
the Horn of Africa. He took advantage of the weakened state of 
Ethiopia after the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974 by 
Mengistu Haile Mariam. 94  Cuba sent in 17,600 combat troops, 
including 6,000 military advisers.95 These forces were well backed by 
Soviet military equipment, including air power, worth about US$1 
 
88 . See Fidel Castro: How Cuban Leader Changed Southern Africa, BBC (Nov. 28, 
2016), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-38130554 [https://perma.cc/FGL2-B9F6]. 
89 . PIERO GLEIJESES, THE CUBAN DRUMBEAT: CASTRO’S WORLDVIEW: CUBAN 
FOREIGN POLICY IN A HOSTILE WORLD 34 (2009). 
90. Gleijeses, supra note 52, at 194. Then Soviet defense official Vasily Kuznetsov stated 
that the idea to intervene was part of Cuba’s independent policy toward Africa that “had 
originated in Havana, not Moscow.” Id. Then Soviet ambassador to the U.S. Anatoly Dobrynin, 
spoke similarly when he stated that the Cubans sent their troops “on their own initiative and 
without consulting us [i.e. with Moscow].” Id. at 194 n.150. See Conflicting Missions: Secret 
Cuban Documents on History of African Involvement, THE NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE 
(April 1, 2002), https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB67/ [https://perma.cc/8CDE-
2YUE] (stating that Cuba made the decision to send troops without informing the Soviet Union 
and deployed those troops without Soviet assistance for the first two months). 
91. Gleijeses, supra note 51, at 3 (stating that the CIA concluded years later that the 
intervention was a “unilateral Cuban operation designed in great haste”). 
92. Sumnall, supra note 28. 
93. See id. 
94. See Martin Plaut, How Fidel Castro Became a Hero and a Villain in the Horn of Africa, 
QUARTZ AFRICA (9, 2016), https://qz.com/africa/859579/in-ethiopia-and-somalia-fidel-castros-
legacy-is-very-different/ [https://perma.cc/3L7E-VZVY]. 
95. Id. 
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billion.96 Prior to the invasion, both Moscow and Havana maintained 
relations with Ethiopia and Somalia, but switched decisively to the side 
of Ethiopia after attempts to reconcile the two sides failed.97 
Overall, under Castro, for a period spanning “over thirty years” 
from when it began in the 1960s, “Cuban soldiers and officers [were] 
on duty-service or [ . . . ] fought hand-in-hand with African soldiers and 
officers in [Africa] for national independence or against foreign 
aggression [ . . . .]”98 It did not come without cost. Within the same 
period, particularly during the second phase of Havana’s involvement 
in the region, about ten thousand Cuban soldiers died fighting for the 
freedom of Africans.99 During the same period, over eighty thousand 
Cuban “civilian cooperators [ . . . ] rendered internationalist services in 
Africa [ . . . ].”100 The number included 24,714 doctors, dentists, nurses 
and health-care technicians, as well as professors, teachers, engineers, 
and other skilled workers, numbering in the tens of thousands.101 In 
education alone, about “30,000 Africans studied in Cuba on full 
scholarships funded by the Cuban government[,]” 102  and Cuban 
educational institutions “graduated 26,294 professionals and 
technicians” plus another 5,850 trained there.103 While in disbursing its 
assistance, Cuba focused on  revolutionary regimes, its support actually 
extended to both capitalist states as well as to those treading the path 
of socialism.104 One evidence in support of this proposition is the fact 
that Cuba under Castro played a major role in the Non-Aligned 
Movement (“NAM”) second only to former Yugoslavia.105 It was the 
only founding member then from Latin America. 
 
96. Id. (stating that “[a]t one time a Soviet aircraft was landing in Addis Ababa every 20 
minutes”). 
97. Id. 
98. Fidel Castro, Speech Delivered by Commander-In-Chief Fidel Castro at the South 
African Parliament (Sept. 4, 1998), 
http://www.cuba.cu/gobierno/discursos/1998/ing/f040998i.html[https://perma.cc/82U4-FLN6]. 
99. See Sean Jacobs, If Africa is a Country, Then Fidel Castro is One of Our National 
Heroes, AFRICA IS A COUNTRY (Nov. 26, 2016), https://africasacountry.com/2016/11/viva-fidel 
[https://perma.cc/2MVM-9TRT]. 
100. Castro, supra note 98. 
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102. Gleijeses, supra note 51. 
103. Castro, supra note 98. 
104 . See DOMINGUEZ, supra note 30, at 184-218 (discussing Cuba’s relations with 
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105. See Int’l Institute for Non-Aligned Studies, Cuba and the Non-Aligned Movement, 
NEW DELHI TIMES (Aug. 13, 2015), https://www.newdelhitimes.com/cuba-and-the-non-
aligned-movement123/ [https://perma.cc/C44R-ZTBJ]. The NAM is a forum of about 
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On the surface, from the standpoint of scale, these measures of 
assistance may not seem like a lot. But closely considered, this is 
phenomenal for a diminutive country of limited natural resources 
geographically closely located to the United States and under the 
behemoth’s siege of economic embargo, 106  with the result that its 
economic lifeline depended on assistance from the Soviet Union, the 
United States’ bitter rival. 107  As commentators point out regarding 
Cuban casualty emanating from its engagement in Angola and 
Mozambique, especially Angola, the estimated fourteen thousand 
soldiers who died there dwarfed the number of American fatalities in 
Vietnam.108 
 
120 developing states (Third World), not formally aligned with or against any major power bloc, 
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A second factor, beyond raw numbers, that made Cuban 
assistance, including socioeconomic aid, phenomenal, is that it added 
up instructively to change the balance of power in the southern African 
region, from Angola and Mozambique all the way through Namibia 
and South Africa, to the benefit of Cuba and proponents of African 
decolonization.109 The South Africans were on the verge of crushing 
the MPLA when Cuba airlifted thirty-six thousand combat troops into 
Angola.110 The scale of Cuban assistance strengthened the hand of the 
MPLA in its struggle against FNLA and UNITA in the civil war that 
engulfed Angola to the point that, with the encouragement of the US 
government, South African forces invaded Angola on the side of the 
FNLA and UNITA.111 But it was too little, too late, as the MPLA 
coasted to victory against its rivals, driving South African forces out of 
Angola. Cuban military victory in Angola helped speed the collapse of 
minority rule in South Africa based on the policy of apartheid or 
separateness (with the socioeconomic immiseration it spelled for 
Blacks), paving the way for majority rule in the country. 112 It also 
simultaneously helped bring independence to Namibia, a trust territory 
that rather than prepare for independence, consistent with the 
stringencies of UN trust mandate, the minority regime in South Africa 
instead extended its policy of apartheid into. It was this weight of 
significance that Nelson Mandela had in mind when he pointed out that 
the Cuban military victory over the South African army “destroyed the 
myth of the invincibility of the white oppressor [ . . . ] [and] inspired 
the fighting masses of South Africa. [It] was the turning point for the 
liberation of our continent—and of my people—from the scourge of 
apartheid.”113 
 
109. See generally PIERO GLEIJESES, VISIONS OF FREEDOM: HAVANA, WASHINGTON, 
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Kissinger reasoned that success in Angola by way of defeating a pro-communist regime would 
boost US prestige and his own reputation, battered by the fall of South Vietnam in April of 1975. 
Gleijeses,  supra note 51. 
112. Id.; see Gleijeses, supra note 51. 
113. Nelson Mandela, quoted in Gleijeses, supra note 51, at 188. 
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In many ways, the victory immensely benefited Cuban national 
security interests. This is why it is easy to understand why, as Gleijeses 
points out, Cuba insisted that its withdrawal from Angola be conducted 
in a manner that created a positive legacy of Cuban influence in African 
history.114 First, until Cuba’s successful engagement in Angola, extra-
continental military interventions were the preserve of the two 
superpowers, and a few West European countries.115 Cuba’s massive 
use of force, first in Angola between 1975 and 1976 to repel a South 
African invasion, and next in Ethiopia in 1978 to help defeat a Somali 
invasion, were stunning developments that became even more 
impressive when it is considered that not even the Soviet Union sent 
this scale of troops beyond its immediate borders in those heady years 
of the Cold War between East and West.116 These factors were the 
reason Professor Piero Gleijeses praised Cuban foreign policy there, in 
its unprecedentedness, as “a policy without equal” in modern times.117 
Professor Jorge I. Dominguez reasoned similarly when he portrayed 
Cuba under Castro as a diminutive country which boldly and repeatedly 
exercised and projected the foreign policy of a major power.118 And to 
the delight and pride of many Africans, Afro-Cubans played a visible 
role in the Cuban campaigns in Africa during this second phase in 
Cuban-African relations. 119  This helped give teeth to Castro’s 
campaign against racism and related prejudice like xenophobia.120 
 
114. Piero Gleijeses, The United States and Castro’s Cuba in the Cold War, OXFORD 
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9780199766581/obo-9780199766581-0073.xml [https://perma.cc/6PM7-KDXN]. 
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117. GLEIJESES, supra note 89 at 9. 
118. See generally DOMINGUEZ, supra note 30. 
119. See, e.g., Frank F. Taylor, Revolution, Race, and Some Aspects of Foreign Relations 
in Cuba Since 1959, 18 CUBAN STUD. 19 (1988) (observing that more than domestic policy, 
foreign policy, including missions in Africa with the participation of Afro-Cubans, has promoted 
“full integration” of blacks into Cuban society); Sean Jacobs, To So Many Africans, Fidel Castro 
is a Hero: Here’s Why, GUARDIAN (Nov. 30, 2016), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/nov/30/africa-fidel-castro-nelson-mandela-
cuba [https://perma.cc/KRY5-RS6J] (reflecting on a “paradox” in Cuba’s African policy 
embedded in  “a progressive foreign policy on race,” including missions abroad with Afro-
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120. See infra Part IV.C. (analyzing the interaction and intersection of Cuban national 
security and service to the International Socialist Movement, particularly the last portion of that 
discussion). 
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Second, Cuban engagement in Africa under Castro, including the 
access to socioeconomic goods that it afforded to revolutionary and 
non-revolutionary regimes alike, provided another platform for Cuban 
resistance to US power. As Professor Gleijeses recounts, when Castro 
attempted to spread revolution in Latin America, the United States 
responded by containing the spread of his influence within the 
hemisphere, including trying to overthrow him. 121  Thus, the 1960s 
turned out to be years of unceasing hostility between Washington and 
Havana, but by the 1970s, particularly under the Jimmy Carter 
administration from 1977 to 1980, relations warmed up and the storm 
seemed to abate. 122  Castro has consolidated his power and partly 
because of the failure of the Cuban regime’s guerrilla offensives in 
Latin America, US officials believed Castro had lost his zeal to export 
revolution abroad.123 This assumption proved incorrect with successive 
successful Cuban interventions, first in Angola and soon after in 
Ethiopia with tectonic impacts from the Horn of Africa all the way 
down to Namibia and South Africa. The unanticipated forays dismayed 
US officials who accused the Soviet Union of masterminding the 
interventions. 124  In short, compared to Latin America where 
Washington successfully flexed its muscles at Cuba’s expense, in 
southern Africa, to the utter embarrassment, if not humiliation, of the 
US government, “Cuba changed the course of history[,] despite 
Washington’s best efforts to prevent it.”125 
 
121. Gleijeses, supra note 114. 
122. Id.; Jennifer Lynn McCoy, Jimmy Carter in Cuba, THE CONVERSATION (Aug. 14, 
2015), https://theconversation.com/jimmy-carter-in-cuba-46109 [https://perma.cc/EH2J-
XB8Q] (commenting on how in 1977, President Carter removed all travel restrictions on 
Americans to travel to Cuba and took the first big steps toward normalization of relations 
between the two countries while the Cold War still raged). 
123. Regarding the failure of revolutionary activities in Latin America instigated by the 
Castro regime, see, e.g., Javier Farje, Fidel Castro: A Latin American Story, ALJAZEERA (Nov. 
29, 2016), https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2016/11/161129085116132.html 
[https://perma.cc/ZKT6-CUUK] (observing that “guerrillas tried to repeat the Cuban 
experience, … but were mercilessly crushed by national armies, many of whose officers had 
been educated in the dubious art of counter-insurgency by the US at the School of the 
Americas in Panama,” with the result that “[b]y 1967, when Che Guevara [Castro’s personal 
emissary] was executed in Bolivia after he failed in his efforts to form a guerrilla group to invade 
his native Argentina, armed struggle as an instrument of change had fizzled out”). 
124. See supra notes 90-91 and corresponding texts. 
125. Gleijeses, supra note 114, at 172. 
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V. DEFENDING SOCIALIST VALUES “TO THE LAST ATOM”: A 
MULTI-LEVEL ANALYSIS 
Explaining the reform of the “special period in time of peace” 
from 1990 until 2008, marked by termination of Soviet ideological and 
economic support, Castro advised Cubans “to have trust in what the 
government and party are doing[,]” elaborating that “[t]hey are  
defending, to the last atom, socialist ideas, principles[,] and goals.”126 
Leading to this viewpoint, Castro observed that even though his regime 
“do[es] not have a smidgen of capitalism or neo-liberalism” in its vein, 
nonetheless it faced “a world completely ruled by neo-liberalism and 
capitalism.”127 However, the occurrence cannot and should not spell 
surrender.128 Instead, it means the regime must “ad[a]pt to the reality 
of that [changed] world[,]” while staying true to its ideals and goals, 
precisely what Cuba is doing courageously and cool-headedly.129 Cuba 
reached this crossroad in its revolutionary history because, under 
Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet Union chose to end its subsidies to 
Cuba, the result of perestroika, economic restructuring in the Soviet 
homeland coupled with a “new thinking” in external relations.130 
In performing its duties for the international socialist movement, 
Castro’s Cuba utilized socioeconomic instruments that the literature 
tends to lump together with military assistance.131 This Article has 
disaggregated these material and cultural goods human beings need.132 
What remains in Part V is to put these socioeconomic goods in analytic 
perspective. To restate, this Article argues that the promotion of these 
socioeconomic goods in Africa were driven by a set of three 
interrelated variables: (1) domestic Cuban national security interest, (2) 
service to the international socialist movement, and (3) the synergistic 
interaction of these two variables. Additionally, this Article makes a 
case for why Cuba under Castro deserves due recognition as a global 
 
126. LEYCESTER COLTMAN, THE REAL FIDEL CASTRO 291-92 (2003). 
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130. Id. at 260-61, 276. For details on the Soviet leader’s change programs, see, e.g., 
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ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/place/Russia/The-Gorbachev-era-
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Thinking, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Feb. 1, 1989), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-
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Good Samaritan, one of a rare example from the socialist world in an 
academic literature now dominated by exclusive attention to capitalist-
oriented states.133 The basis for the argument is the country’s broad 
view of national security achieved through pursuit of principled 
policies abroad that consistently and systematically infused human 
rights in external policies.  
A. Pursuit of Socioeconomic Human Rights in Service to Cuban 
National Security 
Colloquially speaking, “national security” refers to the security of 
a country, including its people, institutions, and economy.134 It is a 
bounden duty of any government. 135  National security is an 
indeterminate concept that different scholars define and operationalize 
differently.136 Two of the most memorable of these definitions are by 
the writer Walter Lippman and the political scientist Harold D. 
Lasswell. Lasswell wrote laconically in 1950 that “[t]he distinctive 
meaning of national security [ . . . ] is freedom from foreign 
dictation.”137 For his part, in a 1943 definition, Lippmann stated that a 
state possesses this property “when it does not have to sacrifice its 
legitimate interests to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain 
them by war.”138 More recently and most elaborately, Harold Brown, 
US Secretary of Defense under President Jimmy Carter, stated that a 
country has national security when it is able to perform certain key 
governing functions like preserve its “physical integrity and territory,” 
“control its borders,” “maintain its economic relations with the rest of 
 
133. See ALISON BRYSK, GLOBAL GOOD SAMARITANS: HUMAN RIGHTS AS FOREIGN 
POLICY (2009). See also PHILIP C. AKA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN NIGERIA’S EXTERNAL AFFAIRS: 
BUILDING THE RECORD OF A MORAL SUPERPOWER (2017) (extending the argument for 
application of human rights in external affairs to Nigeria, a capitalist state). 
134. See Morton Berkowitz & P. G. Bock, National Security, INT’L ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (2008), https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences-and-
law/political-science-and-government/military-affairs-nonnaval/national-security 
[https://perma.cc/FR99-YS2A] (defining the concept, from a social science standpoint, as “the 
ability of a nation to protect its internal values from external attacks,” specifically as “the manner 
in which nations plan, make, or evaluate the decisions and policies designed” to increase their 
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135. See id.  
136. See generally Anton Grizold, The Concept of National Security in the Contemporary 
World, 11 INT’L J. WORLD PEACE 37 (1994).  
137. JOSEPH J. ROMM, DEFINING NATIONAL SECURITY: THE NONMILITARY ASPECTS 79 
(1993). 
138. Id. at 5. 
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the world on reasonable terms,” and prevent its political system from 
external disruption.139 
Governments use various techniques, including political, 
diplomatic, economic, and military means to promote their countries’ 
national security.140 Creative governments also embark on regional and 
international initiatives designed to reinforce domestic measures in 
promoting their national security.141 This is the key to the strong link 
between domestic and foreign policies. Some observers who have 
commented on this topic consider foreign policy an extension of 
domestic policy by non-domestic means.142 It was this interlinkage that 
former US President Dwight Eisenhower, a former army general, had 
in mind when, in his farewell, he advised the United States to beware 
of the military-industrial complex, because of the threat this 
phenomenon poses for democratic government. 143  The military-
industrial complex is an opportunistic league between defense 
contractors and military interests in the US government to keep defense 
spending up beyond the real military needs of the country. 144  For 
Eisenhower, it is foolhardy to undermine at home the very goals the 
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ARCHIVE (Feb. 2015), http://nssarchive.us/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/2015.pdf 
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Kingdom: Security In An Interdependent World, CABINET OFFICE (Mar. 2008), 
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include terrorism, nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, transnationally 
organized crimes, global instability and conflict as well as failed and fragile states, civil 
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System”: Mises on International Organizations and the World Trade Organization, 19 
INDEPENDENT REV. 357 (2015). 
143 . Ike’s Warning of Military Expansion, 50 Years Later, NPR (Jan. 17, 2011), 
https://www.npr.org/2011/01/17/132942244/ikes-warning-of-military-expansion-50-years-
later [https://perma.cc/9PX5-FY4J].  
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United States seeks, ab initio, to achieve abroad through design and 
implementation of a coherent foreign policy.145 
Cuban foreign policy under Castro was fundamentally 
nationalistic. 146  Castro understood the importance of promoting at 
home the very goals Cuba seeks to achieve abroad through the 
instrumentality of a well-designed and implemented foreign policy. 
Accordingly, it adopted a broader definition of national security going 
beyond political-military concerns to encompass socioeconomic 
benefits that it then exported abroad. Although at his death some critics 
called him a “radical bent on transformational, alternative global 
development,”147 even his American detractors conceded that Castro 
was “inspired by a messianic sense of mission to aid his people.”148 
Although he occasionally showed sensitivity to Soviet views on issues 
bearing on the relationship between Cuba and the Soviet Union, the 
official positions of the Kremlin were rarely the decisive factor in his 
pursuit of causes either at home or abroad.149 
To the very end, Castro propagated production of socioeconomic 
benefits, as a matter of human rights, rather than privilege, that leaders 
must “fight without truce” to provide for citizens. 150  It was not a 
guarantee limited domestically only to Cubans. Instead, from the tone 
of his voice, the “human beings” penciled down for these benefits 
included Cubans at home and non-Cubans abroad alike. 
B. Pursuit of Socioeconomic Human Rights in Service to the 
International Socialist Movement 
Another variable accounting for Castro’s contributions to 
socioeconomic human rights in Africa was service to the international 
socialist movement. Henry Kissinger, US Secretary of State under 
Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, observed that Castro “was 
probably the most genuine revolutionary leader then [in the 1970s] in 
power.”151 Kissinger was and is still a realist and believes that states 
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are unitary actors in world politics that must use self-help to navigate 
an international system without a world government (“anarchy”).152 
Commentators not influenced by realist theory have expressed 
similar views regarding the commitment of Castro to international 
communism. 153  These include Bill Bonnar, who, in his eulogy of 
Castro, praised the deceased former Cuban leader as “a giant of 
socialism.”154 He elaborated in a statement arguably speaking to the 
intertwining of domestic and external policies next below, that 
“Castro’s entire political life was given to the struggle for Cuban 
independence[,] and the struggle for liberation and socialism all over 
the world.”155 Bonnar was national secretary of the Scottish Socialist 
Party;156 so, there may be observers who will consider his views as 
lacking in objectivity since, like Castro, he belonged in the 
international socialist movement. But there were non-socialist 
commentators who voiced similar assessments. 157  One such 
commentator was Jeremy Corbyn, leader of the Labor Party in the 
United Kingdom, who eulogized Castro as a “huge figure of modern 
history, national independence[,] and 20th century socialism.”158 As 
previously mentioned, Corbyn praised Castro “as an internationalist 
and a champion of social justice.”159 He gave Castro credit for many 
achievements, including building world-class health and education 
systems, a record of international solidary abroad, and support for the 
decolonization struggle in Angola which helped end apartheid in South 
Africa.160 
The connection of all this to socioeconomic human rights is that, 
in serving the cause of international communism in Africa, Cuba 
utilized an assortment of assistance that ranged beyond conventional 
political-military assistance to include socioeconomic goods. Castro’s 
embrace of NAM and Cuba’s leadership of the Movement second only 
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to Yugoslavia, meant that these socioeconomic benefits were not 
limited to revolutionary states and regimes. Instead the benefits were 
occasionally extended to non-revolutionary states, especially those that 
touted themselves non-aligned. From 1979 to 1982, Castro was 
president of the Conference of NAM held in Havana. For him, the 
battle against imperialism was something larger than the Cold War and 
resistance of US hegemony; it was a battle against despair and 
oppression in the developing world.161 Accordingly, as the next section 
shows, Castro used his leadership of this movement to draw attention 
to global issues of interest to developing countries. 
C. Interaction and Intersection of Cuban National Security and 
Service to the International Socialist Movement 
This section deals with events that do not belong in the first two 
categories because, synergistically, those events bestride both 
categories.  Jeremy Corbyn’s assessment which praised Castro as a 
“huge figure of [ . . . ] national independence[,] and 20th century 
socialism,” 162  arguably falls into this category. So too is the more 
elaborate evaluation by Bill Bonnar to the effect that “Castro’s entire 
political life was given to the struggle for Cuban independence[,] and 
the struggle for liberation and socialism all over the world.”163 
There are three such events that illustratively we highlight here. 
The first is represented in Castro’s belief, demonstrated in words and 
deeds, in the indivisibility of political-civil rights and socioeconomic 
rights. Recall the comment earlier in this Article regarding the 
complementarity of political-civil rights and socioeconomic rights and 
therefore the inseparability of these guarantees. 164  Inspired by this 
wisdom or despite it, in a 1979 message to the United Nations General 
Assembly, Castro gave a speech that demonstrated the interlinkage 
between political-civil rights and socioeconomic rights, specifically 
how lack of attention to socioeconomic human rights can have 
consequences for political-civil rights, particularly “the rights to life 
and human dignity”: 
Why should some people walk barefoot, so that others can travel 
in luxurious cars? Why should some live for thirty-five years, so 
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that others can live for seventy years? Why should some be 
miserably poor, so that others can be hugely rich? I speak on behalf 
of the children in the world who do not have a piece of bread. I 
speak on behalf of the sick who have no medicine, of those whose 
rights to life and human dignity have been denied.165 
Castro made another connection between the two categories of 
rights in 2002, when, in a speech that year, he pointed out that “the ever 
more sophisticated weapons piling up in the arsenals of the wealthiest 
and the mightiest can kill the illiterate, the ill, the poor and the hungry[,] 
but they cannot kill ignorance, illnesses, poverty or hunger.”166 There 
were times when Castro took full advantage of the platform of the 
NAM to draw attention to global issues that affected the developing 
world. One such instance was in October 1979 when in his capacity as 
both President of the NAM as well as of Cuba he gave a widely-
applauded speech on the disparity between the world’s rich and poor.167 
The second of the issues straddling the matter of national security 
and service to international communism that this subsection covers, a 
problem common to the developing world, is the debt crisis. Castro 
denounced the problem of Third World debt, going so far as to host 
five international conferences on the issue.168 This should be viewed as 
another angle in measuring the size of Cuban contribution to 
socioeconomic human rights under him, bound to benefit Africans 
more, given the status of Africa as the poorest continent in the world 
from the standpoint of poverty alleviation.169 For, despite the natural 
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wealth of many African countries, many Africans live below the 
poverty line, as defined by United Nations institutions, compared to 
countries in other continents.170 
A third and last issue is the fight against racism and xenophobia. 
Castro assessed the current economic order in the world dominated by 
the United States and other industrialized countries to be “not only 
unjust, cruel, inhumane,” but also as well “racist.” 171  This line of 
thought continued in his speech at the UN Conference against Racism 
in Durban, South Africa, in September of 2001 with fourteen thousand 
delegates from 194 countries in attendance. There, Castro opined that 
rather than being a natural human instinct, racism, racial 
discrimination, and xenophobia are sociocultural and political 
phenomenon “born directly of wars, military conquests, slavery and the 
individual or collective exploitation of the weakest by the most 
powerful in the history of human societies.”172 In addition to the issue 
of reparations for slavery of Blacks, Castro focused his speech on 
alleged Israeli mistreatment of Palestinians whom he called “victim[s] 
of the most fierce persecution, discrimination and injustice that history 
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has known.”173 He pled for an “end to the ongoing genocide against” 
them while the world watched rather than come to their help.174 
Castro accused the United States and the industrialized economies 
of being “beneficiaries of the conquest and colonization, of slavery, of 
the ruthless exploitation and the extermination of hundreds of millions 
of people born in the countries that today constitute the Third 
World.”175 In a statement released ahead of the conference published 
in the Cuban official newspaper Granma, the Cuban government 
posited that although apartheid has been abolished in South Africa, “at 
least 250 million people on the planet are still living under the yoke of 
segregation and servitude.” 176  Moving further, it assessed the 
AIDS/HIV epidemic in Africa to be “the bitter harvest of a global 
discrimination,” in turn the result of “five centuries of racism, slavery 
and impoverishing colonialism.”177 A news story reporting the visit 
indicated, “[a] heavily symbolic trip, Castro is traveling from a country 
where most of its 11 million citizens have some African ancestry to the 
continent where thousands of Cuban troops died helping free black 
nations from white colonialism.”178 
Following the conference, Castro met with a group of about 440 
Cuban medical personnel said to be providing healthcare services in 
South Africa.179 And before leaving South Africa, Castro met with 
former South African leader Nelson Mandela, unable to attend the 
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conference due to ill-health, who reportedly stated: “What [Castro] did 
for us is not easy to describe in words. During the struggle against 
apartheid, Fidel did not hesitate in giving us help, and now that we are 
free, we have many Cuban medical doctors working here, helping us in 
rural areas, where there are practically no physicians.”180 Given that, as 
one commentator observed, Castro’s regime did “more for Afro-
Cubans in 50 years than previous administrations [ . . . ] in the last 400 
years[,]” 181  Castro’s campaign against racism and xenophobia also 
paralleled and gave tonic to his achievements at home related to that 
campaign. 
D. Cuba under Fidel Castro as Global Good Samaritan from the 
Socialist World 
Global Good Samaritans is the name Professor Alison Brysk 
coined for states and other political communities who consistently and 
systematically apply human rights in their external relations.182 In their 
foreign relations, global Good Samaritans project a “kindness of 
strangers” driven by the biblical injunction to “love your neighbor as 
yourself.”183 Six such states that Brysk surveyed in her seminal work, 
each of which, to varying degrees, applied human rights in external 
affairs, in alphabetical order, were Canada, Costa Rica, Japan, the 
Netherlands, South Africa, and Sweden. The seventh was a set of 
transnational human rights organizations, “coalitions of the caring,” 
including the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE), and the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance (IDEA). Whether coincidentally or deliberately, all of these 
political communities were capitalist-oriented. The current author’s  
study, focused on Nigeria, equally involved a capitalist country.184 
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Given the extensiveness of its socioeconomic assistance 
documented in this Article, Cuba under Castro deserves to be included 
in the pantheon of global Good Samaritans. The academic literature 
related to this topic has holes that Cuba as a socialist state can fill. The 
critic might argue that Cuba promoted these rights as part of the 
privileging of socioeconomic over political-civil rights by the socialist 
world in its competition against “bourgeois capitalism” that hallmarked 
the Cold War. 185  But, as we see in this Article, there was no 
opportunism in the use of this tool: Cuba’s use of this tool predated the 
high point of the Cold War and Havana exported abroad the same 
“material and cultural goods that human beings need” that it dispensed 
so well at home without discrimination to all groups, including Afro-
Cubans, for whom, socioeconomically, Castro did more “in 50 years 
than previous administrations [ . . . ] in the last 400 years.”186 
Commenting on Cuban military and socioeconomic assistance 
from 1961 to 1965, Professor Gleijeses aptly observed that “[i]f Cuba’s 
foreign policy were based solely on realpolitik, Cuba would have not 
helped Algeria. Its assistance to Algeria reflects a level of idealism that 
is unusual in the foreign affairs of great or small powers and that has 
continued to be part of Cuban policy toward Africa through all these 
years.”187 Witness Castro recounting, in October of 1963, the story of 
Havana’s aid to Algeria: 
Men and weapons from our country crossed the Atlantic in record 
time to fight side by side with the Algerian revolutionaries. [ . . . ] 
Distance did not prevent us from being the first to arrive. [ . . . ] 
We, a small country relentlessly threatened by the imperialists, 
sent some of our best weapons to the Algerian people.188 
Somewhat parenthetically, this statement also speaks to Cuba’s 
status as an independent actor, rather than as a Soviet proxy. This 
occurrence is contrary to the contention of many US and other Western 
analysts, much of which was shrouded in the propagandistic posturing 
that marked the Cold War. In intervening in Africa, particularly 
Angola, Castro’s Cuba acted independently without securing the 
support of the Soviet authorities then engaged in détente with the 
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United States.189 It also acted in defiance of the United States with 
whom before the intervention it sought to warm up relations. Worse 
still, it did this at the risk of US invasion. Both at home and abroad, 
Castro’s commitment to socioeconomic human rights was driven by 
his personal “trust in the intelligence of peoples and men[,]” a trust 
driven by the belief that “the greatest crises have always given rise to 
the greatest solutions.” 190  Therefore, it is hard to gainsay the 
observation that critics of Castro who complained about his one-party 
rule and repressive policies, including his intervention in Africa, never 
said he was “on the wrong side of history” or that he “sponsored 
dictatorships in [ . . . ] developing countries.”191 
Complementing Cuba’s socioeconomic human rights efforts, 
Cuban military assistance in Africa during the period under review was 
arguably “human rights as foreign policy” in action.192 Recall Castro’s 
farewell address to delegates at the Seventh Congress of the 
Communist Party of Cuba, specifically his observation that with hard 
work and dedication, Cuban communists “can produce the material and 
cultural goods that human beings need.”193 His overall action over his 
period in office suggests that the “human beings” he had in mind 
included people in Cuba and elsewhere in the world, including 
Africans. Like in everything else, global Good Samaritans need not be 
perfect so long as they robustly interject human rights in their 
principled foreign policy, 194  something Cuba under Castro did. 
Therefore, this Article’s evaluation of Castro as global Good Samaritan 
by no means dismisses the human rights abuses, particularly in the 
realm of political civil-rights, that took place under his watch. 195 
 
189. See Conflicting Missions, supra note 90 (stating that Cuba made the decision to send 
troops without informing the Soviet Union and deployed them without Soviet assistance for the 
first two months). 
190. Castro, supra note 98, at 5. 
191. Jacobs, supra note 119.  
192. BRYSK, supra note 133. 
193. See Carroll, supra note 2. 
194. AKA, supra note 133, at 256 (focusing on Nigeria). 
195. See Human Rights Watch, Cuba: Fidel Castro’s Record of Repression, HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH (Nov. 26, 2016), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/11/26/cuba-fidel-castros-
record-repression [https://perma.cc/9LA5-UMRY] (pointing out that under Castro, “[t]he 
progress on economic, social, and cultural rights was never matched in terms of respect for civil 
and political rights”). This press release quoted José Miguel Vivanco, Americas director at 
Human Rights Watch to the effect that “[a]s other countries in the region turned away from 
authoritarian rule, only Fidel Castro’s Cuba continued to repress virtually all civil and political 
rights.” Id. It regretfully observed that “[m]any of the abusive tactics developed during his time 
in power,” such as “surveillance, beatings, arbitrary detention, and public acts of repudiation,” 
2019] CASTRO AND SOCIOECONOMIC HUMAN RIGHTS 75 
Events in the United States since January of 2017 when President 
Donald J. Trump took office teach the lesson that even countries 
usually regarded as paragons of democracy and human rights may at 
times backslide  and tread in an unprogressive direction.196 
With Castro’s death in 2016 and the end of his era, discussing his 
regime’s qualification as global Good Samaritan is necessary for the 
dispassionate reassessment of his legacy. It has been argued elsewhere,  
using Nigeria in its Fourth Republic since 1999 as an example, that 
charity begins at home, and that countries that do not integrate human 
rights in their external affairs will have no human rights peace at 
home.197 Specifically, states who deny their citizens socioeconomic 
benefits at home will not treat “strangers” abroad well. 198 Castro’s 
Cuba illustrates this point. The country prioritized education, 
healthcare, housing and other welfare goods that it had no difficulty 
pursuing abroad with passion even with economic constraints at 
home.199 Foreign policy is an extension of domestic policy by other 
means. As Dwight Eisenhower advised and Castro exemplified, it is 
foolhardy to undermine at home the very values a state seeks to realize 
abroad through the design and implementation of its external 
policies.200 
Given its population of less than twelve million people and its 
modest natural resource base, Cuba under Castro consistently cast a 
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large shadow over the international stage in many areas, including 
socioeconomic human rights.201 As John Kirk and Michael Erisman 
observed in their work instructively titled Cuban Medical 
Internationalism, despite its small size, Cuba has saved more lives in 
the developing world than all of the G-8 countries joined together.202 
Under Castro, in exemplary demonstration of “human rights as foreign 
policy” in action, Cuba provided medical services to the developing 
world that tracked the public health that it reserved for its citizens at 
home.203   
VI. CONCLUSION 
Given the level of poverty in Africa,204 there is imperative need 
for socioeconomic human rights to complement political-civil rights. 
No single statesman outside Africa promoted these rights more than 
Castro. Both in Cuba and abroad, in Africa, Castro fought tirelessly to 
provide access to socioeconomic goods. The scale and consistency of 
these contributions for a small country with an economy contained by 
US embargo make Cuba under Castro a global Good Samaritan within 
the context of principled application of human rights in external affairs. 
As Nelson Mandela observed during his visit to Cuba in 1991, “[w]hat 
other country can point to a record of greater selflessness than Cuba 
has displayed in its relations to Africa?”205 
This Article seeks to promote proper understanding of Cuba’s 
military assistance programs in Africa, especially during the period of 
1975 to 1991. Its position is that these programs may be profitably 
viewed from multiple levels, additional to the factor of service to 
international communism that dominates the academic literature. There 
are two shifts in the literature, hopefully this Article initiates, that need 
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to take place. The first is disaggregation of socioeconomic goods from 
the general category of Cuban military assistance. The second is a 
movement away from the overemphasis on capitalist countries when it 
comes to countries who consistently apply human rights in their 
external affairs. For balance, these studies must now include socialist 
states. 
Two interesting questions outside the scope of this Article must 
be kept in mind for future studies: first, given the indivisibility of civil-
political and socioeconomic rights, to what extent has the socialist 
world now embraced political-civil rights rather than see it as part of 
the baggage of “bourgeois capitalism”? Second, related to this first 
question, to what extent, if any, does Cuba still provide access to 
socioeconomic human rights in Africa, given that post-Castro Cuba 
remains socialist? Regarding the second question, two intertwined 
trends are discernible that bear recounting here: medical 
internationalism, and “human rights as foreign policy” in action.206 
Castro’s successors continue to provide socioeconomic 
assistance, in the form of medical missions, to Africa.207  Testament to 
this proposition is a tropical cyclone, Hurricane Idai, that, in March 
2019, hit several countries in southern Africa but left the lion’s share 
of its destructive effect from high winds, rains, and flooding, on 
Mozambique. 208  The cyclone wreaked extensive damage on the 
country, including the death of about 500 people. 209  The Cuban 
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government responded in humanitarian assistance with a field hospital 
installed in Beira (population: nearly 600,000 residents), one of 
Mozambique’s largest city and one of the cities most affected by the 
natural disaster.210 The field hospital consisted of 20 hospital beds with 
consultations, an operating room, a clinical and microbiological 
laboratory, and imaging equipment. 211  The contingent of Cuban 
medical personnel, numbering sixteen doctors, twenty-two specialists 
and two service workers, who joined more than 300 already on the 
ground, 212  spent 63 days in the country during which period they 
provided medical care to over 22,000 patients and performed over three 
hundred surgeries on adults and children.213 In announcing the dispatch 
of the field hospital to Mozambique, Cuban President Miguel Diaz-
Canel twitted “[f]rom Cuba, we sent personnel, equipment and 
medicines to strengthen health care [in Mozambique], assuming our 
solidarity and internationalist vocation.”214 Cuban Minister of Public 
Health Jose Angel Portal spoke no less effusively when he observed 
that the medical personnel “wrote a new page of solidarity for Cuban 
public health, and they are part of that history that shows the world 
what we are capable of doing.”215 
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